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CRIMINAL LAW-WAIVER-PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION REQUIRES AN
EXPLICIT WAIVER OF Miranda RIGHTS.
Commonwealth v. Bussey (Pa. 1979)
Bruce B. Bussey was arrested in connection with a murder investi-
gation. 1 At the scene of the arrest, Bussey was given the Miranda
warnings 2 advising him of his constitutional rights.3 He did not, how-
ever, explicitly indicate that he understood or waived those rights.4
Bussey was transported to a local police station,5 where, after he stated
that he was "all right and not under the influence of drugs or alcohol," 6
he was asked if he knew why he was arrested. 7 In response to the ques-
tion, he implicated himself in the murder, stating that he had "killed
that dude in Pennsylvania." 8 Later that night, after being reminded of
his admission, 9 Bussey gave two complete accounts of his complicity in
the crime. 10
1. Commonwealth v. Bussey, 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 114, 120 (1976), rev'd,
486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309 (1979). Bussey was arrested by New Jersey police
at 1:30 a.m. on December 14, 1973 in Burlington, New Jersey. 29 Bucks Co.
L. Rep. at 120.
2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Under Miranda, prior to
interrogation, law enforcement officials must inform a suspect that "he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any question-
ing if he so desires." Id. at 478-79. For a discussion of Miranda, see notes
23-24 and 31-34 and accompanying text infra.
3. 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 118.
4. 486 Pa. at 227, 404 A.2d at 1312.
5. 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 120.
6. 486 Pa. at 227. 404 A.2d at 1312. Bussey's statement was in response
to a question put to him by a detective. Id.
7. 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 119.
8. Id.
9. Id. Following his answer, at 1:45 a.m., to the question of why he
thought he had been picked up, Bussey made two statements in questioning
sessions conducted at 2:00 a.m. and 4:28 a.m., respectively. Id. at 120-21.
10. Id. at 120-21. In the 2:00 a.m. session, Bussey was again given the
Miranda warning before being subjected to questioning. Id. at 120. After
acknowledging that he understood his rights and declaring that he was "willing
to answer questions without the presence of an attorney," Bussey denied com-
plicity in the crime and blamed the killing on "three men who broke into
[Bussey's] house .... ." 486 Pa. at 227, 404 A.2d at 1312. Relying on Bussey's
earlier answer to the question of why Bussey thought he had been arrested, a
state trooper accused Bussey of lying. Id. Bussey, close to tears, then gave an
incriminating statement. 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 117. The questioning ses-
sion ended at 2:30 a.m. on instructions from the district attorney's office to
(205)
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At trial, Bussey moved to suppress his statements." The trial court,
finding an implicit understanding and waiver of constitutional rights,' 2
admitted the statements into evidence and, sitting without a jury, con-
victed Bussey of first degree murder.'3 On appeal, Bussey argued, inter
alia,14 that the trial court had erred in failing to suppress the inculpa-
tory statements and permitting their evidentiary use at trial because the
statements had been elicited without a valid waiver of his constitutional
rights. 15 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,' 6 in a plurality decision,"7
stop the interrogation until a formal statement could be taken by a court
stenographer. Id. at 121.
Prior to taking the formal statement at 4:28 a.m., Bussey was again ap-
prised of his rights and again expressly indicated that he understood his rights.
486 Pa. at 228, 404 A.2d at 1313. When asked whether he would answer ques-
tions without the presence of an attorney,' Bussey, in turn, asked the assistant
district attorney present to recommend a decision. Id. Upon being told that
the decision was "up to [him]," Bussey agreed to answer the questions. Id.
The trial court characterized the 2:00 a.m. statement as a "manifestation
of an emotional reaction" and not an exercise of the right to remain silent.
29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 119-20. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
declined to decide whether this characterization was accurate. 486 Pa. at 227
n.9, 404 A.2d at 1313 n.9.
11. 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 115.
12. Id. at 120. The trial court stated that the additional warning of the
right to stop speaking after an initial consent to interrogation, which Bussey
asserted should have been given to him, was not required by Miranda and that
the warning given to Bussey fully complied with the directives in Miranda.
Id. at 119. For a summarization of the warnings required to be given to
suspects under Miranda, see note 2 supra.
13. 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 123. In post-trial motions, Bussey argued that
the trial court had erred in failing to dismiss the prosecution under rule 1100
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, that his constitutional rights
were violated because he was not advised of his "right" to stop speaking and
remain silent after initially having consented to interrogation, and that there
was unnecessary delay between the time of his arrest and preliminary arraign-
ment. Id. at 115.
14. E.g., Bussey also contended that the complaint against him should have
been dismissed since trial was not commenced within 270 days as required by
rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. PA. R. CRIM. P.
1100. For a discussion of this contention, see note 18 infra.
15. 486 Pa. at 226, 404 A.2d at 1312.
16. Chief Justice Eagen authored the opinion of the court and was joined
by Justices O'Brien and Roberts. Id. at 232, 404 A.2d at 1315. Justice Man-
derino concurred only in the result. Id. Justice Larsen dissented from the
court's requirement of an explicit waiver. Id. at 235, 404 A.2d at 1316 (Larsen,
J., dissenting). justice Nix did not reach this issue, but dissented from the
court's disposition of a question concerning the application of rule 1100 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 232, 404 A.2d at 1315 (Nix,
J., dissenting). See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100. For a discussion of the Bussey
court's holding on the rule 1100 issue, see note 18 infra.
17. The precedential value accorded to an opinion signed by a plurality
of those judges participating in a decision is apparently an open question in
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refused to be bound by
an opinion which represented the views of only two justices in a four justice
[VOL. 26: p. 205
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reversed and remanded the case, holding that the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution requires an explicit waiver of constitutional rights before an
accused's inculpatory statements may be admitted into evidence against
him at trial.' s Commonwealth v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309
(1979).
Under both the Pennsylvania Constitution and the United States
Constitution, a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to be a witness
majority. Bata v. Central Penn Nat'l Bank, 448 Pa. 355, 293 A.2d 343 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Commonwealth v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 248
A.2d 32 (1968). Cf. Commonwealth v. Mason, 456 Pa. 602, 604, 322 A.2d 357,
358 (1974) ("[w]hatever the effects of an opinion supported by less than a
majority of those justices participating may be, there can be no doubt that
when a majority of those justices participating join in the opinion, it becomes
binding precedent in the courts of Pennsylvania"). But see Beron v. Kramer-
Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (applying Pennsylvania
law) ("where ... an opinion addresses several different issues, and when no
part of the opinion appears to have the approval of a majority, the opinion
reflects only the personal views of its author and is not endowed with the force
of law").
18. 486 Pa. at 230-31, 404 A.2d at 1314, citing Commonwealth v. Walker,
470 Pa. 534, 546, 368 A.2d 1284, 1290 (1977) (Eagen, J., concurring); Common-
wealth v. Goldsmith, 438 Pa. 83, 263 A.2d 322 (1970). In addition to the issue
of explicit waiver, Bussey raised a second argument regarding the application
of rule 1 100(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. 486 Pa.
at 224, 404 A.2d at 1311. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(a)(1). That provision
requires that "trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against
the defendant after June 30, 1973 but before July 1, 1974 shall commence no
later than two hundred seventy (270) days from the date on which the com-
plaint is filed." Id. The complaint charging Bussey with murder was filed on
December 14, 1973 and trial was commenced 283 days later on September 23,
1974. 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 115. Bussey contended that, since the 270 day
limitation of rule 1l00(a)(1) had been exceeded by 13 days, the trial court was
precluded from taking jurisdiction of the case and had erroneously denied his
application for an order dismissing the charges pursuant to PA. R. GRIM. P.
1100(f). 486 Pa. at 224, 404 A.2d at 1311. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(f). The
prosecution argued that the period from December 21, 1973 until January 18,
1974 was properly excluded from the computation because during that time
Bussey had attempted to procure private counsel and the Commonwealth could
not, therefore, bring him to trial. 486 Pa. at 224-25, 404 A.2d at 1311. On
January 18, 1974, Bussey appeared before the court with counsel at which time
a continuance was requested and granted. Id. at 225, 404 A.2d at 1311.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Bussey's argument, holding that
the trial court had properly characterized the period between December 21,
1973 and January 18, 1974 as a period of 'unavailability of the defendant or
his attorney" which, under rule 1l00(d)(1), is excluded from computation of
the period within which trial must be commenced. Id. at 225-26, 404 A.2d at
1311-12, citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(d)(1).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Nix maintained that the 28 day period
between December 21, 1973 and January 18, 1974 should be characterized as a
continuance and, as such, is not excludable from the period for trial if less
than 30 days under rule 1100(d)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. 486 Pa. at 234-35, 404 A.2d at 1315-16 (Nix, J., dissenting), citing
PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(d)(2). Therefore, Justice Nix would have granted Bussey's
motion for dismissal under PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(f). 486 Pa. at 235, 404 A.2d
at 1316 (Nix, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the application of rule 1100,
see Marshall 8c Reiter, A Trial Court Working With Rule 1100, 23 VILL. L.
REV. 284 (1978).
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against himself 19 or be denied the right to counsel. 20 The protections
offered by the United States Constitution 21 apply whenever a suspect is
subjected to custodial interrogation by law enforcement officials.22 To
protect these rights, the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark
decision of Miranda v. Arizona,23 established the per se rule that unless
19. See U.S. CONs-r. amend. V; PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 9. The fifth amend-
ment provides in pertinent part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under
the Pennsylvania Constitution, an accused "cannot be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself . ..... PA. CONST. art. I, § 9. The federal privilege
against self-incrimination applies to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9. The sixth amend-
ment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Article 1, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be
heard by himself and his counsel .... ." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9. The sixth
amendment right to counsel applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21. State courts are not permitted to lessen the protection offered by the
federal constitution and must, at a minimum, adhere to the requirements
established by the United States Supreme Court to safeguard the constitutional
rights of an accused. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See also
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment held applicable to states
under due process clause of fourteenth amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment held binding on states through due
process clause of fourteenth amendment). However, Pennsylvania courts are
free to construe the Pennsylvania Constitution as providing greater protection
for an accused. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d
1283 (1979); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 236 n.2, 369 A.2d 1277, 1284
n.2 (1977) (Roberts, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 183
n.22, 369 A.2d 1234, 1256 n.22 (1977); Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215,
219 n.2, 239 A.2d 290, 292 n.2 (1968). Justice Brennan has noted with approval
that "of late ... more and more state courts are construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their
states even more protection than the federal provisions, even those [provisions
which are] identically phrased." Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rgh ts, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 495 (1977). One commentator
has noted:
For a state court interpreting a state constitution, opinions of the
United States Supreme Court are like opinions of sister state courts or
lower federal courts. While neither binding in a constitutional sense
nor precedential in a jurisprudential one, they are entitled to whatever
weight their reasoning or intellectual persuasiveness warrant.
Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground,
61 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 283 (1973). See note 50 infra.
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966). For a discussion of
the concept of custodial interrogation, see Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Mas-
siah, and Miranda: What Is Interrogation? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo.
L.J. 1 (1978).
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court
held that police must inform an accused in custody of his rights to counsel and
against self-incrimination in order to reduce the inherent pressures of a cus-
todial interrogation. Id. at 445-58, 478-79. For a discussion of Miranda, see
[VOL. 26: p. 205,
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a suspect is expressly advised of his rights, any post-arrest statements
made by him are inadmissible against him at trial.
24
An accused may, however, choose to waive the constitutional rights
of which the Miranda Court required him to be informed.25 The defi-
nitional precedent of waiver 2e is contained in Johnson v. Zerbst.27 In
Zerbst, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with the issue
of whether a suspect had waived his sixth amendment right to counsel at
trial.28 Defining waiver to be "an intentional relinquishment of a
known right or privilege," 29 the Zerbst Court required that courts ex-
amine the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether a valid
waiver had been executed. 0 To ensure that an accused is able to make
a meaningful choice in deciding whether to waive his constitutional
rights, the Miranda Court further developed this test, stating that the
prosecution has "a heavy burden . . . to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and right to . . . counsel" before a suspect's statement taken dur-
ing custodial interrogation will be admitted.31 While increasing the
Rothblatt & Miller, Police Interrogations: Warnings and Waivers-Where Do
We Go From Here, 42 N.D. LAW. 479 (1967); Schrock, Welsh & Collins,
Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1978);
Warden, Miranda-Some History, Some Questions, Some Observations, 20 VAND.
L. REV. 39 (1966).
24. 384 U.S. at 478-79. For a discussion of these mandatory warnings, see
note 2 supra.
25. See 384 U.S. at 475, citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14
(1963).
26. See 384 U.S. at 475, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
27. 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
28. Id. The Zerbst decision involved two suspects, who, without the assist-
ance of counsel, were convicted of counterfeiting and sentenced to jail. Id. at
459-60. The district court denied the prisoners habeas corpus relief, holding
that the absence of counsel did not render the trial void. Id. at 458-59. The
United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the absence
of counsel at trial is a bar to a conviction unless the accused has validly waived
his right to counsel. Id. at 467-68.
29. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 464. The Court stated that a finding of waiver "must depend,
in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including background, experience and conduct of the accused." Id.
One commentator has identified the following factors which courts have
considered in determining whether the waiver was coerced or freely given under
the Zerbst "voluntariness-totality of the circumstances" test: (I) physical abuse;
(2) threats; (3) extensive questioning; (4) incommunicado detention; (5) denial
of the right to consult with counsel; (6) individual deficiencies and talents of
the accused; (7) status of the accused, and (8) youth. Comment, Waiver of
Rights in Police Interrogations: Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U. CH. L.
REV. 413, 413 n.2 (1969).
Nevertheless, the Zerbst Court indicated that "courts indulge every reason-
able presumption against waiver." 304 U.S. at 464, quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1936); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
31. 384 U.S. at 475, citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14
(1963). The Miranda Court indicated that the prosecution should have the
2091980-1981]
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prosecution's burden of showing that a waiver was validly given,82 the
Miranda Court did not specifically address the question of whether an
explicit waiver of an accused's rights was required to satisfy the new
standard of an intentional, knowing, and intelligent waiver or whether
an implied waiver would suffice.8 3 This question, then, became a source
heavy burden of proving that the defendant had made a valid waiver "[s]ince
the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which
the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available
corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interroga-
tion .. " 384 U.S. at 475.
32. 384 U.S. at 444, 479. Under the Zerbst rule, the prosecution must
show that, considering the surrounding circumstances, a suspect's waiver was
not the product of coercion. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
The Miranda decision appears to have increased the prosecution's burden by
requiring a showifig that the waiver be both freely given and knowingly and
intelligently made. 384 U.S. at 444, 479. See note 31 and accompanying text
supra. The Miranda Court's intent to shift from the Zerbst rule to a more
stringent standard is also evidenced by the Court's statement to the effect that,
"in traditional terms," the defendant's statements might be considered volun-
tary. See 384 U.S. at 457.
The broader Zerbst standard engendered a variety of problems when ap-
plied by the courts. For a discussion of the problems created by the Zerbst
standard, see Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confessions Cases in
the Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35 (1962).
33. The Miranda Court, however, made several statements outlining the
boundaries of waiver. See 384 U.S. at 470-76. Specifically, the Court held that
" n]o effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recog-
nized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been
given." Id. at 470. Additionally, the Court opined that the failure of the
accused to make a pre-interrogation request for counsel does not amount to a
waiver. Id. But the Miranda Court did find that statements made in the
absence of compulsion, after the accused has expressed a desire to remain silent
but in the presence of an attorney, "might fairly be construed as a waiver,"
and that "an express statement that the individual is willing to make a state-
ment and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could
constitute a waiver." Id. at 474 n.44, 475.
The Court specifically held, however, that a valid waiver will not be pre-
sumed simply because the accused remains silent or gives a confession after the
warnings are given. 384 U.S. at 475. Moreover, a waiver will not be presumed
"if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his
own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated." Id. at
475-76. In discussing circumstances which might bear upon the effectiveness of
the waiver, the Court found that "the fact of lengthy interrogation or incom-
municado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the
accused did not validly waive his rights." Id. at 476. Further, "any evidence
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will . . .
show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." Id.
A requirement of an explicit waiver might be found in the Court's state-
ment that "[n]o effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation
can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate
have been given." Id. at 470 (emphasis added). Moreover, two of the dis-
senting justices interpreted the Court's opinion to require an explicit waiver.
Justice Clark, inferring the requirement of an explicit waiver from the major-
ity's opinion, declared that "even in Escobedo the Court never hinted that an
affirmative 'waiver' was a prerequisite to questioning .... Id. at 502 (Clark,
J., dissenting). Justice Harlan wrote: "To forego these rights, some affirmative
statement of rejection is seemingly required .... " Id. at 504 (Harlan, J.,
[VOL. 26: p. 205
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of continuing controversy following Miranda8
One year after the Miranda decision, in United States v. Hayes,8 5
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit faced the
question of whether, as a matter of law, an express waiver was necessary
to meet the requirements of Miranda.86 The Fourth Circuit concluded
that an express statement of waiver was not required as a matter of
law8 7 and that, under Miranda, a valid waiver may be found in the
conduct of an accused.88
dissenting). He added: "To require also an express waiver by the subject ...
might heavily handicap questioning." Id. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
On the other hand, two arguments for the position that an explicit waiver
is not compulsory may be culled from the Miranda opinion. Under the first,
a valid waiver may be found where a "fully effective equivalent" of the
Miranda warnings and waiver exist. Id. at 476. The Court seemed to suggest
that the "presence of counsel" at interrogations would constitute such an
equivalent. Id. at 466. The Court noted, however, that "this does not mean
., that each police station must have a 'station house lawyer' present at all
times to advise prisoners." Id. at 474. One commentary has suggested that
an alternative "fully effective equivalent" might be that an accused be advised
of his rights by a magistrate with implied waivers subject to strict judicial
supervision. See Developments-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 1007 (1966).
Another commentator has suggested, however, that the "fully effective equiva-
lent" provision appears to be unworkable since neither the practice of auto-
matic presence of counsel nor waiver under judicial supervision have been
adopted. See Comment, supra note 30, at 423-24.
A second theory rests upon the Court's assertion that an express statement
could constitute a waiver. 384 U.S. at 475. While this statement appears to
permit implicit waivers, a comparison with the earlier passage in the opinion
which mandates that a waiver be "specifically made" illustrates the ambiguity
engendered by the Miranda opinion on the question of implied or express
waivers. See Comment, supra, at 427.
34. See notes 35-62 and accompanying text infra.
35. 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert.,denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1968).
36. 385 F.2d at 377-78. Hayes was arrested on suspicion of transporting
falsified checks in interstate commerce. Id. at 377. Prior to custodial inter-
rogation at a local police station, Hayes was informed of his rights under
Miranda, but he was not asked whether he understood his rights or wished to
have retained or appointed counsel. Id. Although Hayes did not volunteer
any information on either point, he responded incriminatingly to leading
questions and was subsequently convicted. Id. at 376-77. On appeal, he con-
tended that, as a matter of law, an express statement of waiver is necessary to
satisfy the Miranda standard for waiver. Id. at 377.
37. Id. at 377. In defining the circumstances which will satisfy the waiver
requirement of Miranda, the Hayes court opined that "[o]f course the attendant
facts must show clearly and convincingly that [the accused] did relinquish his
constitutional rights knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, but a statement
by the defendant to that effect is not an essential link in the chain of proof."
Id. at 378.
38. Id. at 378. The Hayes court ruled that "strong and unmistakeable
circumstances" which may establish the "fully effective equivalent" of a waiver
are those which "are sufficiently weighty to demonstrate defendant's knowing
and voluntary waiver." Id. The court found that the circumstances in this
case were "sufficiently weighty" to support a finding of an effective waiver on
the grounds that defendant Hayes voluntarily made statements to police; was
not physically or psychologically coerced; and was healthy, alert and poised
enough to carry out a fraudulent check scheme and call his attorney after being
1980-1981]
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While some courts have rejected the Hayes holding by requiring an
express waiver from the accused,3 9 the Hayes decision has come to repre-
sent the majority view that an implicit waiver satisfies the Miranda man-
date of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, with ten of the
eleven federal courts of appeals 40 and at least seventeen state courts
adopting the view expressed by the Hayes decision.4 1 Furthermore, a
given his rights. Id. Under the Hayes decision, a waiver, implied from a
suspect's conduct after being apprised of his constitutional rights, satisfies the
Miranda standard of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. As stated
by the Hayes court: "The lower court found the incriminating statements [of
Hayes to be] 'voluntary' and hence admissible, thereby impliedly finding that
Hayes had made a constitutionally permissible waiver. This implicit finding
is well-substantiated." Id. (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Sullins v. United States, 389 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1968). In
Sullins, none of the defendants had expressly declined consultation with coun-
sel after being informed of their constitutional rights. Id. at 988. The court
deemed inadmissible oral statements made by the defendants after the Miranda
warnings had been recited to them because none of the defendants specifically
waived their right to counsel. Id. While the Sullins court did not expressly
reject the rationale of Hayes, it would appear that the holding in Sullins is
contrary to that of Hayes. In his dissent in Sullins, Judge Lewis characterized
the majority opinion as requiring an, explicit waiver of an accused's Miranda
rights. Id. at 989 (Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Lewis wrote: "I do not agree, as I read the main opinion to hold, that an
express declination of the right to counsel is an absolute from which, and only
from which, a valid waiver can flow." Id. For other decisions requiring an
explicit waiver of Miranda rights, see, e.g., People v. Anonymous, 58 Misc. 2d
13, 294 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1968) (affirmative act in form of specific answer to ques-
tion relating to waiver of rights necessary); People v. Jacobsen, 57 Misc. 2d
1046, 294 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1968) (accused must affirmatively and expressly waive
his constitutional right); People v. Kessler, 53 Misc. 2d 268, 278 N.Y.S.2d 423
(1967) (express waiver of constitutional rights mandated).
40. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Blackledge, 541 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Marchildon, 519 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Boston, 508
F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Cooper, 499 F.2d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States
v. Moreno-Lopez, 466 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v.
Speaks, 453 F.2d 966 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1071 (1972); Hughes v.
Swenson, 452 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104
(3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841 (1971); United States v.
Hilliker, 436 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958
(1971); United States v. Ganter, 436 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970); Bond v.
United States, 397 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1035 (1969).
41. See, e.g., Sullivan v. State, 351 So. 2d 659 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 351 So. 2d 665 (Ala. 1977); Lloyd v. State, 45 Ala. App. 178, 227 So. 2d
809 (1969); State v. Pineda, 110 Ariz. 342, 519 P.2d 41 (1974) (en banc); State
ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 506, 513 P.2d 935 (1973) (per curiam);
People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 450 P.2d 865, cert. denied,
395 U.S. 969 (1969); People v. Shaw, 267 Cal. App. 2d 679, 73 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1968); People v. Samaniego, 263 Cal. App. 2d 804, 69 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1968);
People v. Weaver, 179 Colo. 331, 500 P.2d 980 (1972) (en banc); Reed v. People,
171 Colo. 421, 467 P.2d 809 (1970); State v. Craig, 237 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970);
Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 442, 238 S.E.2d 12 (1977); People v. Brooks, 51 Ill. 2d
156, 281 N.E.2d 326 (1972); People v. Higgins, 50 111. 2d 221, 278 N.E.2d 68
(1972); State v. Wilson, 215 Kan. 28, 523 P.2d 337 (1974); State v. Hazelton,
[VOL. 26: p. 205
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majority of courts which have ruled that an implied waiver is sufficient
to meet the requirements of Miranda have clearly indicated that the
waiver need not be in written or oral form 42 and have rejected the con-
tention that a failure or refusal to sign a written waiver form will pre-
.clude the finding of an effective waiver.4 3
The issue of whether an express waiver was required under the
federal constitution was finally decided by the United States Supreme
Court in North Carolina v. Butler.4 4 When confronted with a North
Carolina Supreme Court ruling which required an explicit waiver of
330 A.2d 919 (Me. 1975); Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 247 A.2d 530 (1968);
Mullaney v. State, 5 Md. App. 248, 246 A.2d 291 (1968); Brown v. State, 3 Md.
App. 313, 239 A.2d 761 (1968); Commonwealth v. Valliere, 366 Mass. 479, 321
N.E.2d 625 (1974); Commonwealth v. Murray, 359 Mass. 541, 269 N.E.2d 641
(1971); State v. Alewine, 474 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1972); Burnside v. State, 473
S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1971); State v. Hughes, 460 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. 1970); State v.
Kremens, 52 N.J. 303, 245 A.2d 313 (1968); Shirey v. State, 520 P.2d 701 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1974); Phillips v. State, 481 P.2d 776 (Okla. Grim. App. 1971);
State v. Davidson, 252 Or. 617, 451 P.2d 481 (1969); State v. Matt, 251 Or. 134,
444 P.2d 914 (1968) (en banc); State v. Wright, 251 Or. 121, 444 P.2d 912 (1968)
(en banc); Commonwealth v. Walker, 470 Pa. 534, 368 A.2d 1284 (1977); Com-
monwealth v. Garnett, 458 Pa. 4, 326 A.2d 335 (1974); Commonwealth v. Gold-
smith, 438 Pa. 83, 263 A.2d 322 (1970); Bowling v. State, 3 Tenn. Grim. App.
176, 458 S.W.2d 639 (1970); State v. Young, 89 Wash. 2d 613, 574 P.2d 1171
(1978) (en banc); State v. Blanchey, 75 Wash. 2d 926, 454 P.2d 841 (1969).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Cassino, 467 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973); United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424
(10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Speaks, 453 F.2d 966 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1071 (1972); United States v. Stevens, 445 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 945 (1971); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841 (1971); United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d
354 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971); United States v. Van
Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Thompson, 417 F.2d 196
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1047 (1970); Lopez v. United States, 399
F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1968); West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Boykin, 398 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Corbbins,
397 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968); Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1006 (1968); Solino v. United States, 387 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1968);
Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1967).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Zamarripa, 544 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Caulton,
498 F.2d 412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 898 (1974); United States v.
Cooper, 499 F.2d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Moreno-Lopez, 466
F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v. Speaks, 453 F.2d 966
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1071 (1972); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d
1104 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841 (1971); United States v.
Crisp, 435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971); United
States v. Thompson, 417 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1047
(1970); Bond v. United States, 397 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1035 (1969); Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1967); Hodge
v. United States, 392 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1968); Tucker v. United States, 375
F.2d 363 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 888 (1967).
44. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
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Miranda rights, 45 the United States Supreme Court found that the
Miranda requirements could be satisfied by a less rigorous standard of
implied waiver.46 The majority opinion characterized the requirement
of an express waiver as being an "inflexible, per se rule" 47 which elimi-
nated the possibility that a waiver could be inferred from a suspect's
words or actions.48 The Butler majority ruled that the North Carolina
Supreme Court's adoption of a more rigorous waiver standard went
"beyond the requirements of federal organic law," 49 and thus, since the
state supreme court had rested its decision solely on federal constitu-
tional requirements, its error in construing those requirements rendered
45. State v. Butler, 295 N.C. 250, 244 S.E.2d 410 (1978), vacated sub nom.
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). Appellant Butler, charged with
robbery, kidnapping and assault, was advised of his rights at the scene of his
arrest, and again at a police station. He also read an "Advice of Rights" form,
which described his constitutional rights in detail. 441 U.S. at 370-71. Al-
though he refused to sign the waiver form after being informed by police that
he need not speak or sign the form, Butler indicated that he understood his
rights and gave incriminating statements. Id. at 371. Butler said nothing
when advised of his right to an attorney and neither requested counsel nor
attempted to terminate the interrogation. Id. Finding that he had effectively
waived his rights, the trial court denied Butler's motion to suppress the evi-
dence of his inculpatory remarks. Id. at 371-72. The jury then found Butler
guilty of each offense charged. Id. at 372. The North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that Butler's statements had been
admitted in violation of the Miranda requirements because Butler did not
waive in writing or orally his right to have counsel present. Id.
46. Id. at 373. The Supreme Court's rejection of the North Carolina
construction of Miranda was unequivocal:
[T]he [Miranda] Court did not hold that such an express statement
is indispensable to a finding of a waiver.
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to
remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the
validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or suf-
ficient to establish waiver: The question is not one of form but rather
whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the
rights delineated in the Miranda case.
Id. The Butler Court determined that the North Carolina Supreme Court's
rule of an express waiver was not the type of safeguard which the Miranda
decision required to reduce the inherent pressure of a custodial interrogation
and ensure the free exercise of constitutional rights. Id. at 374.
47. Id. at 375.
48. Id. at 373. The Supreme Court insisted that "the defendant's silence,
coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating
waiver, may ... support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights."
Id. Although the Court in Butler did not specifically define the course of
conduct which would indicate waiver, the Court, in relying on Zerbst, coun-
tenanced a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether there had
been an effective waiver by noting that the finding of a valid waiver depends
on "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. at 374-75, quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
49. 441 U.S. at 376.
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its decision invalid.50 In his dissent,51 Justice Brennan criticized the
majority for "allowing courts to construct uncertain inferences from
ambiguous words and gestures," 52 and asserted that the Miranda re-
quirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver could be
.satisfied only by an express waiver,5 3 which, he further contended, would
foster certainty.
54
Until Bussey, Pennsylvania courts 55 consistently applied the "total-
ity of the circumstances" test for waiver as sanctioned by Miranda.56
In Commonwealth v. Walker,5 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court spe-
cifically approved "the totality of the circumstances" approach for the
50. Id. In overruling the North Carolina Supreme Court's construction
of the constitutional requirements, set forth in Miranda, the Butler Court
applied federal constitutional law. Id., citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975). In Hass, the Supreme Court observed that although
a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions
on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary under
federal constitutional standards . . . a State may -not impose such
greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this
Court specifically refrains from imposing them.
Id. at 719 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied by the Court). For a discus-
sion of a state court's power to require greater constitutional protection under
state law, see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
51. 441 U.S. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and
,Stevens joined with Justice Brennan's dissent. Id.
52. Id. In the Butler case, there were factual disputes over whether Butler
was orally apprised of his rights before he implicated himself and whether he was
able to read. Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan noted,
if Butler was not orally advised of his rights, could not read them himself, and
refused to sign a written waiver form, the Court would have no way of con-
cluding that he knowingly waived them. Id. Justice Brennan suggested that,
had the majority ruled in favor of explicit waiver, such uncertainty as that
occasioned by the dispute over Butler's ability to read an Advice of Rights
form would not plague courts in the future. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dis-
.senting).
53. Id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reasoned that
"only the most explicit waivers of rights can be considered knowingly and
freely given" in order to prevent the pressures of custodial interrogations with
which the Miranda case was concerned. Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Justice Brennan viewed a requirement of explicit waiver as imposing
no greater burden on the police than that already imposed by the Miranda
warning requirement. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
indicated that an explicit waiver standard would require only a simple express
.answer to the question of whether an accused wishes to waive his rights. Id.
54. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan maintained that
an explicit waiver requirement would eliminate the possibility that courts
would violate the defendant's constitutional rights by finding a waiver where
none existed, or frustrate society's interest in effective law enforcement by
failing to find a waiver where it did. Id. at 378-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. See notes 57-62 and accompanying text infra.
56. For a discussion of Miranda, see notes 2, 23-24 & 31-34 and accompany-
-ing text supra.
57. 470 Pa. 534, 368 A.2d 1284 (1977).
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determination of a valid waiver.5 8 In Commonwealth v. Goldsmith,5 9'
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to find a valid waiver under
Miranda where the prosecution did not carry its heavy burden of show-
ing that the defendant understood and waived his rights.0° Faced with
the contention that the accused had been denied his right to counsel
during interrogation, the supreme court in Commonwealth v. Garnett 61
found a valid implied waiver where the accused continued to answer
police questions after having been repeatedly warned of his rights.
6 2
Against this background, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bussey
undertook an examination of whether the appellant had validly waived
58. 470 Pa. at 539, 368 A.2d at 1287. The Walker court stated:
[A]ll the attending factors and circumstances must be considered and
evaluated when determining the validity of an alleged waiver of
constitutional rights. Such factors include:
"T]he duration, and the method of interrogation; the conditions
of detention, the manifest attitude of the police toward the de-
fendant, the defendant's physical and psychological state and all
other conditions present which may serve to drain one's powers of
resistance to suggestion and undermine his self-determination....
[W]hen the question of voluntariness passes beyond the realm of
physical coercion and into degrees of psychological coercion, most
careful attention will be afforded to any facts, circumstances or
events tending to overbear the will of the accused."
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 184-85, 335 A.2d 698, 701
(1975). The Walker court advocated express responses not to questions of
waiver, but to standard warnings and questions about an accused's understand-
ing of his rights. 470 Pa. at 546, 368 A.2d at 1290 (Eagen, J., concurring).
59. 438 Pa. 83, 263 A.2d 322 (1970).
60. Id. at 85, 263 A.2d at 324. In Goldsmith, the prosecution maintained
that a valid waiver could be found where the defendant said to police: "I will
give you an oral statement. My lawyer said I could make one without giving
you the motive of what happened." Id. at 86, 263 A.2d at 324. The Gold-
smith court rejected the government's contention since the prosecution offered
no proof of the lawyer's actual statements to the accused from which the court
could ascertain whether the defendant understood his rights when he announced
his desire to give an oral statement. Id. Indeed the supreme court viewed
the above-quoted statement itself as evidence that the defendant did not under-
stand his rights. Id. The Goldsmith court added that since the prosecution
could not demonstrate how or whether defendant responded to the warnings
and questions posed to him by interrogating officers, who could not recall them-
selves whether warnings were actually given and responses received, the govern-
ment failed to meet its heavy burden of proving a valid waiver. Id. at 85-86,
263 A.2d at 324.
61. 458 Pa. 4, 326 A.2d 335 (1974).
62. Id. at 6, 326 A.2d at 335. The Garnett court examined the totality of
the circumstances and concluded that since the defendant was aware of the
charges against him, had consulted with counsel following his arrest, and had
continued to cooperate with police by answering their questions, it was "appar-
ent that the appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel."
Id. (citations omitted). The totality of the circumstances standard, applied by
the Garnett court was similarly relied upon in several other Pennsylvania deci-
sions which recognized the adequacy of an implicit waiver. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Goodwin, 460 Pa. 516, 333 A.2d 892 (1975); Commonwealth v. Ewell,
456 Pa. 589, 319 A,2d 153 (1974); Commonwealth v. Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 296
A.2d 755 (1972); Commonwealth v. Barnette, 445 Pa. 288, 285 A.2d 141 (1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968).
[VOL. 26: p. 205,
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his rights before making the incriminating statements sought to be sup-
pressed.63 Following an extensive review of the facts, 64 Chief Justice
Eagen began his analysis by noting that, as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, an accused may forego his constitutional rights without an
explicit waiver.0 5 Dissatisfied with this state of federal law, 66 the Chief
Justice grounded his opinion on the Pennsylvania Constitution 67 and
held that an explicit waiver of an accused's constitutional rights 68 is
mandatory.69
The first of three reasons offered in support of the plurality's hold-
ing was that an explicit waiver standard would promote certainty and
obviate the need to litigate the question of waiver in many cases.7 0 The
Chief Justice also reasoned that making an explicit waiver obligatory
63. 486 Pa. at 230, 404 A.2d at 1314.
64. Id. at 226-30, 404 A.2d at 1312-14. For a discussion of the facts, see
notes 4-10 and accompanying text supra. Before reciting the facts relating to
the waiver issue, the Chief Justice rejected appellant's contention that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for a dismissal because his trial did not
commence within 270 days after the complaint against him was filed, as re-
quired under PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100. Id. at 226, 404 A.2d at 1312. Chief Justice
Eagen held that the time in which the accused attempts to procure counsel is
to be excluded when determining whether the 270 day requirement has been
met. Id. For a discussion of the rule 1100 issue, see note 18 supra.
65. Id, at 230, 404 A.2d at 1314, citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
369 (1979). For a discussion of the Butler decision, see notes 44-54 and accom-
panying text supra.
66. 486 Pa. at 230, 404 A.2d at 1314. The Chief Justice considered the
allowance of anything less than an explicit waiver to be inconsistent with
Miranda's per se requirement that warnings be given. Id.
67. Id. The Chief Justice noted that he considered the instant case to be
distinguishable from Butler on the basis that Bussey, unlike the defendant in
Butler, never expressed an understanding of his rights prior to incriminating
himself. Id. The Chief Justice specifically refused to distinguish Butler, how-
ever, and declined to follow it. Id. For a discussion of a state court's ability
to require greater protection based on state law, see note 21 and accompanying
text supra; note 50 supra.
68. Since Chief Justice Eagen relied on the court's "supervisory powers
and interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution," 486 Pa. at 230, 404 A.2d
at 1314, the rights to which he was referring, although typically denominated
"Miranda" rights by the courts and commentators, are actually guaranteed
under article 1, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. PA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 9. See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
69. 486 Pa. at 230-31, 404 A.2d at 1314, citing Commonwealth v. Walker,
470 Pa. at 546, 368 A.2d at 1290 (Eagen, J., concurring); Commonwealth v.
Goldsmith, 438 Pa. 83, 263 A.2d 322 (1970). The Chief Justice defined explicit
waiver as an "outward manifestation of a waiver such as an oral, written or
physical manifestation." 486 Pa. at 230 n.ll, 404 A.2d at 1314 n.11. Chief
Justice Eagen was careful to point out, however, that "an express waiver for
each and every right is [not] necessary." Id. at 231 n.12, 404 A.2d at 1314 n.12.
70. 486 Pa. at 231, 404 A.2d at 1314. The Chief Justice remarked that
the requirement of an express waiver would limit the number of cases in which
the accused's remarks and gestures would affect the court's finding of a waiver.
Id. at 231 n.13, 404 A.2d at 1314 n.13. The Bussey plurality echoed Justice
Brennan's concern for certainty in his Butler dissent. Id. at 231, 404 A.2d at
1314. See 441 U.S. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice
Brennan's dissent in Butler, see notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
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would heighten the accused's awareness of the importance of his de-
cision.71 Finally, the Chief Justice viewed the added burden on law en--
forcement officials as nonexistent or at least outweighed by the benefit
of certainty. 72
The Bussey plurality then applied the requirement of an explicit
waiver to Bussey's first statement,7 8 concluding that the statement was
illegally obtained because Bussey had expressed no desire to waive his
rights prior to the interrogation.7 4
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Larsen disagreed with the conclu-
sion that Bussey's statements were obtained as a result of custodial
interrogation 75 and thus would hold that no waiver was necessary.78
Furthermore, Justice Larsen intimated that the implicit waiver standard
set forth in Butler should be applied in the instant case.7 7 Justice Larsen
criticized two of the plurality's three justifications for adopting an "in-
flexible per se rule," 78 indicating that the plurality's rule is unnecessary
71. 486 Pa. at 231, 404 A.2d at 1314. The Chief Tustice supported this
rationale with a footnote in which he noted that the "importance of waiving
one's rights is obvious" and that "persons often speak before they think." Id.
at 231 n.14, 404 A.2d at 1314 n.14.
72. Id. at 231, 404 A.2d at 1315. Chief Tustice Eagen insisted that "if the
Miranda rights must be explained, rthenl merely asking for an answer to a
ouestion is no great burden." Id. This rationale was previously employed in
the dissenting opinion of Tustice Brennan in Biltler. See note 53 suhra.
73. 486 Pa. at 231. 404 A.2d at 1315. Chief Tustice Eagen considered that
since "the question asked of Bussey rwhether he knew why he was arrested
was 'likely to or expected to elicit a confession,' and, hence, constituted inter-
roeation." constitutional protection automatically attached. Id. at 231 n.15,
404 A.2d at 1315 n.15, citinz Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977): Com-
monwealth v. Mercer, 451 Pa. 211, '302 A.2d 337 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 227, 252 A.2d 575, 579 (1969). For a discussion of the
concept of custodial interrogation as it relates to waiver, see Kamisar, supra
note 22.
74. 486 Pa. at 231, 404 A.2d at 1315. Based on this determination, the
Chief Tustice ruled that both of Bussey's subseauent incriminations had to be
excluded as the fruit of the first illegallv obtained statement since they were
given only after Bussey was confronted with his initial confession and, as such.
amounted to an exploitation of the primary illegality. 486 Pa. at 232. 404
A.2d at 1315, citing Commonwealth v. Frazier, 443 Pa. 178, 279 A.2d 33 (1971):
Commonwealth v. Ware. 438 Pa. 517, 265 A.2d 790 (1971). Chief Tustice Eagen
found that neither of the subseouent statements had been "purged of the pri-
mary taint." 486 Pa. at 232, 404 A.2d at 1315, quoting Commonwealth v.
Ware. 4389 Pa. at 521, 265 A.2d at 792.
75. 486 Pa. at 235, 404 A.2d at 1317 (Larsen, T., dissenting).
76. Id. Bussev was asked whether he was all right, whether he was under
the influence of alcohol or drugs, and whether he knew why he was arrested.
Id., 404 A.2d at 1316 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen viewed the nature
of the ouestions asked of Bussey as only informing the police of the charges
against him. Id. Tustice Larsen deemed such questions to be preliminary to
determining whether a defendant is capable of executing a voluntary, knowing,
and intellicent waiver, as required by Miranda, and not likely or designed to
elicit a confession. Id.
77. See 486 Pa. at 236, 404 A.2d at 1317 (Larsen, J., dissentinz).
78. Id. Tustice Larsen agreed that an express waiver would be more de-
sirable from the standpoint of judicial convenience but he did not believe that
the more rigorous standard was necessary in view of the Butler Court's state-
ment that "waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the
[VOL. 26i: p. 205,
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to protect the rights of the accused 79 and would subordinate society's
interest in effective law enforcement to the desire for judicial conven-
ience.80 Justice Larsen concluded that "the question of waiver should
be addressed in terms of substance, and not in terms of 'which of its
forms are the most judicially manageable.' " 81
Upon reviewing the plurality opinion, it is submitted that the
Bussey decision is subject to criticism for its failure to treat adequately
prior federal and state cases dealing with the Miranda waiver standard.8 2
The plurality's position is grounded on its unarticulated assumption
that requiring an explicit waiver will provide more protection of an
accused's constitutional rights than will be afforded by a totality of the
circumstances approach. Since the United States Supreme Court in
Butler has interpreted the federal constitution as not requiring an ex-
plicit waiver,83 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bussey has construed
the Pennsylvania Constitution to do so. 8 4 By its summary refusal either
to follow or distinguish Butler s5 the plurality failed to address the
Butler Court's observation that the requirement of an explicit waiver
would not advance the Miranda goal of minimizing the coercive effect
of custodial interrogation.8 6 It would appear, therefore, that the validity
of the plurality's assumption of additional protection is suspect.
It is submitted that the three-pronged rationale advanced by the
Bussey plurality only partially supports its ruling. The likely result of
the Bussey court's holding will be the implementation of a pro-forma
waiver,87 the validity of which must, in any event, be judged against the
person interrogated." Id., citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
Justice Larsen also grounded his dissent on the fact that "every other court
which has considered the . . . rule adopted by the majority has rejected it."
486 Pa. at 236, 404 A.2d at 1317 (Larsen, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of cases which have considered the explicit waiver standard, see notes 39-43
and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Butler holding, see
notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra.
79. 486 Pa. at 236, 404 A.2d at 1317 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen
conceded, however, that "an express waiver of constitutional rights is certainly
more desirable than a waiver implied from conduct." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The Butler Court had based its decision on the same rationale.
441 U.S. at 373. For a discussion of the Butler approach, see notes 44-50 and
accompanying text supra.
82. For a discussion of cases construing the waiver requirements of Miranda,
see notes 35-62 and accompanying text supra.
83. For a discussion of the Butler decision, see notes 44-54 and accompany-
ing text supra.
84. 486 Pa. at 230-31, 404 A.2d at 1314. For a discussion of the power of
state courts to require stricter standards of constitutional protection, see notes
21 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
87. In Pennsylvania, for example, the official state police manual providesthat
the waiver should be in written form and recorded as precisely as
possible. When practicable, the warning procedure should be taken
15
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Miranda standard of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.88
Thus, it is submitted that the requirement of an explicit waiver will
neither promote certainty nor provide for a more judicially convenient
means for deciding questions of waiver. Consequently, it appears un-
likely that the supreme court's decision will erode the "mountain of
litigation" on this issue as the court anticipates.89 Although any attempt
to streamline the judicial process may seem laudatory given the continu-
ing backlog on court calendars, difficulty in deciding questions of fact
should not preclude judicial inquiry into those questions or justify
sacrificing society's interest in full and effective law enforcement. Thus,
while the Bussey court appears to have adopted an objective manifesta-
tion of intent test by requiring an explicit waiver,9 0 such a requirement
alone will not satisfy the totality of the circumstances test required
under Miranda. Moreover, it is suggested that the announced goal of
certainty may have been muddled by the plurality's cryptic holding that
an express waiver is not required for every right and its subsequent
failure to delineate those rights for which an explicit waiver is required.91
Similarly, the second justification offered in support of the explicit
waiver requirement may be questionable. While the Bussey plurality is
apparently convinced that its explicit waiver rule will force on an ac-
cused a deliberate and intelligent waiver decision, 92 the supreme court's
conviction is undercut by its oversight of those instances in which even
a signed statement will not satisfy the Miranda standard.93 The third
reason for the Bussey court's ruling, however, appears to be sound.
Since it has been demonstrated that law enforcement officials have im-
plemented the Miranda warning procedure without undue burden,94 it
down verbatim by a stenographer. If a stenographer is not available,
the interrogator should incorporate the warnings to the suspect and
the suspect's answers which constitute a waiver directly into the state-
ment, verbatim.
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ed. 1978).
88. See notes 21 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 70 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that requir-
ing Pennsylvania trial courts to evaluate the effectiveness of a waiver based on
a totality of the circumstances test has not created the insurmountable "moun-
tain of litigation," which Chief justice Eagen feared, since Pennsylvania courts
have not been averse to examining the circumstances of an implicit waiver in
the past. For a discussion of Pennsylvania cases adopting a totality of the
circumstances approach, see notes 55-62 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
91. See note 69 supra; note 104 and accompanying text infra.
92. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
93. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 492. The Miranda Court noted
that "[t]he mere fact that Miranda signed a statement which contained a typed
in clause stating that he had 'full knowledge' of his 'legal rights' does not
approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitu-
tional rights." Id.
94. Law enforcement officials did not respond enthusiastically to the
Miranda decision initially, sometimes refusing or neglecting to give the required
[VOL. 26: p. 205'
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
is suggested that the police will not be unduly hampered by the Bussey
court's directive that they obtain an explicit waiver from an accused.95
Finally, it is suggested that, although clearly empowered to do so,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked its supervisory powers and the
Pennsylvania Constitution to serve the perhaps ulterior motive of shield-
ing its decision from reversal by the United States Supreme Court as
experienced by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Butler.96 While
the Pennsylvania Constitution provided an unquestionably valid basis
for the plurality's holding, it is submitted that the Bussey court's reliance
on Goldsmith and Walker 97 was misplaced since, in those cases, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was applying the Miranda totality of the
circumstances standard for waiver.98
It is respectfully submitted that the Bussey plurality could have
avoided the criticisms enumerated above by adopting the totality of the
circumstances approach enforced in a majority of jurisdictions and by
indicating that the existence of an explicit waiver is not dispositive of
the issue of a valid waiver, but rather, is a single weighty factor to be
considered in ascertaining whether an accused has effectively waived his
rights. 99 Although such an approach admits an inherent degree of un-
certainty, it is submitted that the totality of the circumstances standard
allows for a truer determination of whether an accused has executed a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.
Since only a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court joined
the opinion requiring an explicit waiver, it is submitted that the Bussey
decision is of uncertain precedential value and, while persuasive, allows
for greater leeway in interpretation and distinction by lower courts in
Pennsylvania. 100 Moreover, with the recent appointments of Justices
Flaherty and Kauffman to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,10 ' the recent
warnings. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 1347,
1360-70 (1968). It is submitted, however, that court decisions, which freed
suspects who had not been advised of their rights, led police to comply with
the Miranda ruling. For a discussion of the impact of Miranda on police
interrogation practices, see generally Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices
and Attitudes Relating to Interrogation as Re-Revealed by Pre- and Post-
Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity to Comply, 1968
DuKE L.J. 425.
95. See notes 53 & 72 and accompanying text supra. This is the position
taken by the Bussey plurality and Justice Brennan's dissent in Butler. Id.
96. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 18 8c 69 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 55-62 and accompanying text supra.
99. For a suggested list of factors to be considered in determining whether
an accused has validly relinquished his Miranda rights, see Comment, supra
note 30.
100. For a discussion of the effect of a plurality decision in Pennsylvania,
see note 17 supra.
101. Justice Flaherty's appointment came in the wake of Justice Pomeroy's
retirement on November 19, 1978. Justice Kauffman was appointed following
the death of Justice Manderino on November 8, 1979.
1980-1981]
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retirement of Chief Justice Eagen,10 2 and the fact that Justice Nix did
not reach the waiver issue in Bussey,'0 3 the future approach of the
supreme court is subject to speculation.
It is further submitted that in holding that an express waiver is
not required for every right,10 4 the Bussey plurality has left to the lower
courts the task of determining whether one explicit waiver of all rights
is sufficient or whether, for instance, an express waiver is required only
for the right to counsel. Thus, the possibility exists that the lower
courts will elucidate different guidelines which will eventually necessi-
tate an exact delineation by the supreme court of those rights for which
an express waiver is required.
The effect of Bussey on present police practice will be negligible,
since it is currently standard police practice to ask a suspect whether he
understands and wishes to waive his rights. 10 5 In addition, unless Bussey
is read to require a written waiver in every case, a defendant may simply
deny the police officer's version of the facts and thus place the court in
the same position of resolving difficult factual questions as when only
an implied waiver need be shown. It is questionable, then, whether the
Bussey ruling will have an impact on police practice significant enough
to raise the level of protection of an accused's constitutional rights. 106
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Bussey plurality has failed to
achieve its objective of providing additional protection of an accused's
constitutional rights.' 07 The Bussey decision also leaves the uncertainties
of finding a waiver intact. 108 In view of the abrupt departure from the
totality of the circumstances approach enforced in the majority of juris-
dictions,' o9 the anomaly of the express waiver requirement itself,110 the
uncertain precedential value,"' the unclear holding," 2 and insignificant
impact on police practice,"13 it would appear that the Bussey ruling is
ripe for challenge in the lower courts of Pennsylvania.
Kevin Joseph Connors
102. Chief Justice Eagen retired on September 23, 1980.
103. 486 Pa. at 235 n.1, 404 A.2d at 1316 n.1 (Nix, J., dissenting).
104. See note 69 supra; note 91 and accompanying text supra.
105. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
106. For a discussion of possible methods of securing better protection of
an accused's constitutional rights, see note 33 supra.
107. See notes 82-86 &c 92-95 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
109. For a discussion of cases adopting the totality of the circumstances
approach, see notes 35-62 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 92-93 and accompanying text supra.
111. See note 16 supra; notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
112. See note 69 supra; note 91 and accompanying text supra; text accom-
panying note 104 supra.
113. See notes 87, 94-95 & 105-06 and accompanying text supra.
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